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Abstract. We look at the problem of designing Message Recognition
Protocols (MRP) and note that all proposals available in the literature
have relied on security proofs which hold in the random oracle model or
are based on non-standard assumptions.
Incorporating random coins, we propose a new MRP using a pseudoran-
dom function F and prove its security based on new assumptions. Then,
we show that these new assumptions are equivalent to the standard no-
tions of preimage resistance, second preimage resistance, and existential
unforgeability given that F is a pseudorandom function.
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1 Introduction
Message recognition is a notion that has recently been developed for small devices
in ad hoc networks. In particular, the devices have low computational power,
low communication bandwidth and low energy resources. Moreover, they are
placed in an environment where no pre-established authentic information exists
and without the presence of a trusted third party. Although chips in embedded
systems are becoming more and more powerful, researchers have always been
looking for lower complexity algorithms in the past 30 years.
In 2003, Weimerskirch and Westhoff [WW03], realized that achieving message
authentication is not possible under such restrictive assumptions. The notion of
recognition was later formalized by Hamell et al. [HWGW05] and motivated by
Lucks et al. [LZWW08] with the following example. Alice and Bob are two
complete strangers. They meet in a party. Therefore, they have the chance to
briefly meet in person, before they depart. A few days later, Bob receives some
message from a person who claims to be Alice. Now, obviously Bob would like
to recognize the source of the message and make sure the message is sent from
the same person who introduced herself as Alice in the party, and not from a
malicious person, Eve, who is trying to deceive Bob.
As a real life application, one can think of Alice having a contactless smart
badge who wants to buy several movies from a shop owned by Bob. For her
first movie, she walks into the shop and pays using her contactless smart badge.
She would like to download the movie to her computer when she goes home.
Moreover, she would like to buy and download more movies from home with-
out having to walking to the shop in person. That is, Alice would like Bob to
recognize her after the first in person encounter. Many other settings can be
considered when Alice and Bob do not have public keys and do not have the
required time to generate appropriate keys or agree on domain parameters when
they meet for the first time.
More formally, we have two small devices, one sender and one receiver, who
share no secret information and are in a setting where they can send authentic,
but not confidential, information for a short period of time. Later, the sender
wants the receiver to recognize the message it sends. The adversarial goal is to
make the receiver accept a message as sent by the sender whereas the sender
never sent that message. A message recognition protocol (MRP) is secure if the
sender or the receiver detect the active adversary. A passive adversary is not
considered harmful in this setting.
There have been many recent MRP proposals in the literature, see for ex-
ample [GMS09,LZWW08,MS08,Mit03]. However, one can go back to 1998 to
trace the first protocol [ABC+98] which was designed to fulfill the notion of
recognition, although such a term was not used then. Clearly, a digital signa-
ture scheme would suffice: Alice gives her public-key to Bob when they first
meet and, later, signs her messages. However, in message recognition protocols,
one is looking for a cheaper primitive, such as message authentication codes,
as opposed to having to compute modular exponentiations. In the case of this
paper, the message recognition protocol requires one MAC computation and one
pseudorandom function computation. We are unaware of any public-key based
solution that could compete with such efficiency.
1.1 Literature Review
There has been considerable recent interest in designing security protocols for
devices who do not share a secret key which are placed in an environment that
does not provide a public-key infrastructure. One proposal is the use of a narrow-
band authenticated channel, along with a broadband insecure channel, in order
to achieve message authentication in such an environment has been investigated
in several recent papers, see for example [GN04,MS09,SA99,Vau05]. In such so-
lutions, the narrow-band channel is available all the time and can be used at
least once for every message. In this paper however, we are focusing on a more
restricted case where the narrow-band channel is only available once at the be-
ginning at the initialization step. To distinguish between the two, the literature
refers to the more restricted case as recognition, as opposed to authentication.
We now briefly go over the already existing message recognition protocols
and mention their advantages and disadvantages compared to one another.
‘Guy Fawkes’ protocol, designed by Anderson et al. [ABC+98], seems to be
the first in line in proposing a protocol achieving recognition, but not authen-
tication. The first variant requires a time-stamping authority and the second
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variant uses digital signatures for authentication. Hence, the practicality of ei-
ther variants for restricted devices in restricted environments is under question.
‘Remote User Authentication’ protocol, proposed by Mitchell [Mit03], uses a
message authentication code to authenticate the sender. Hence, does not need a
trusted third party. However, it requires computing and sending 2t MAC values
and sending r secret keys for every message. The suggested parameters are t ≥ 35
and r ≈ t/2. Therefore, in terms of computation and communication, it is costly
and not suitable for low power and low communication bandwidth devices.
‘Zero Common-Knowledge’ (ZCK) protocol, by Weimerskirch et al. [WW03],
seemed to be the first to admit all the required properties. Implemented by Ham-
mell et al. [HWGW05], the ZCK protocol proved to be practical for devices with
restrictive properties such as low computational power, low code space, low com-
munication bandwidth, low energy resources. However, Lucks et al. [LZWW08]
found an attack against ZKC which pointed out a flaw in its security proof.
‘Jane Doe’ protocol, designed by Lucks et al. [LZWW08], uses the idea of
using values of a hash chain as keys for MACs to authenticate messages. The Jane
Doe protocol exhibits all the preferred properties for small devices placed in a
hostile environment. Its security proof is based on the assumption that preimage
resistance, second preimage resistance, and their hash chain equivalents, hold
for a hash function. Moreover, it makes use of a message authentication code
that exhibits existential unforgeability and its hash chain equivalent. The hash
chain equivalent properties are non-standard ones. On the other hand, although
provably secure, the Jane Doe protocol has a recoverability problem: with one
move Eve can bring Alice and Bob out of their synchronized states for the life
time of these devices. As a result, they will never be able to communicate again.
Goldberg et al. proposed a self-recoverable MRP [GMS09] to overcome Jane
Doe’s shortcoming in synchronization. They modified the assumptions of the
Jane protocol a little bit, however, they still need to assume the non-standard
hash chain assumptions.
Mashatan and Stinson proposed a message recognition protocol [MS08] which
does not make use of a hash chain. As a result, they claim that the security
assumptions they need become closer to the standard notions of preimage resis-
tance and second preimage resistance. However, the assumptions are not exactly
standard yet, and it comes with a communication cost of sending about twice as
long messages in each flow. Since these protocols are considered in the context
of small devices, power consumption is an issue. One should avoid unnecessary
communication in order to minimize the power consumption.
Hence, the problem of designing a message recognition protocol based on
standard assumptions which exhibits low computational power, low code space,
low communication bandwidth, and low energy resources is yet unsolved. This
is what we try to achieve in this paper. Alongside of other papers in this area,
we do not target any particular device and only specify that low computational
power, low code space, low communication bandwidth, and low energy resources
are the constraints that our devices are dealing with.
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1.2 Our Contribution
We propose an MRP and for the first time prove its security in the standard
model and based on the existence of pseudorandom functions. The essential idea
in our protocol consist in adding random coins in every step of the Jane Doe
protocol or its self-recoverable variant due to Goldberg et al. [GMS09].
The MRP presented in this paper is based on the same design principle of
the protocols by Lucks et al. [LZWW08] and Goldberg et al. [GMS09] which
instructs Alice to send a message m along with a commitment d of m to Bob.
Then, Bob is to make Alice recognize him followed by Alice revealing the key in
which the commitment was computed with. We use the same design principle,
but we use different primitives, e.g., a pseudorandom function. Moreover, the
only source of the randomness in the latter two proposals is the root of a hash
chain, whereas we insert randomness per key while building the hash chain.
Furthermore, using appropriate primitives along with more randomness, we end
up not requiring the non-standard security assumptions that both Lucks et al.
[LZWW08] and Goldberg et al. [GMS09] need to assume. Instead, we prove the
security of our MRP based on standard assumptions. Note that the logic of our
protocol is similar to the protocol due to Goldberg et al. [GMS09], as opposed
to the original Jane Doe protocol, to obtain self-recoverability.
We make use of two primitives, a function F : {0, 1}s+k → {0, 1}s and a
message authentication code MAC : {0, 1}s × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}c. We define new
notions of security for our primitives, F and MAC, namely degree-i preimage
resistance and degree-i second preimage resistance for F , and F -degree-i existen-
tial unforgeability for MAC. Next, we show that these new notions are equivalent
to preimage resistance, second preimage resistance, and existential unforgeability
under the assumption that F is a pseudorandom function.
In each protocol instance, Alice and Bob are only required to exchange one
F output during their encounter (when they meet in the party). This output
can be as short as 80 bits.
As in the Jane Doe protocol, one instance of our MRP provides the message
recognition primitive from Alice to Bob. This is not considered as a limitation
since one uses two separate protocol instances, one in each direction, to achieve
message recognition in both directions. Moreover, the total number of messages
to be recognized is required to be preset, both in the Jane Doe protocol and in
ours, but we propose the last message to be recognized to simulate a new ‘key
exchange during a party’ which enables Alice and Bob to execute the protocol
for another set of messages (see Section 3.2). This is possible whenever message
recognition is in place in both directions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we list and analyze
the properties we require for the function F and the message authentication code
MAC and reduce them to the standard notions. Section 3 is dedicated to our
MRP and proves its security based on the assumptions analyzed earlier.
4
2 Our Security Assumptions and Pseudorandom
Functions
Suppose we have a function F : {0, 1}s+k → {0, 1}s and a message authentication
code MAC : {0, 1}s × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}c. We now present three non-standard
security notions for F and MAC. Later, we show that these notions are equivalent
to standard notions based on the assumption that pseudorandom functions exist.
By F is pseudorandom we mean that the Fr family defined by Fr(ρ) = F (ρ, r)
is a pseudorandom function family. In other words, an oracle initialized with a
random r and implementing Fr would be indistinguishable from another imple-
menting a random function after a polynomial number of queries. Note that we
only require indistinguishability after a single query, and not multiple queries.
Definition 1. For randomly chosen secrets r1, . . . , ri, each having k bits, and
randomly chosen secret ρ0, of size s, let secret ρ1, . . . , ρi−1 and known ρi be such
that ρj = F (ρj−1, rj), where 1 ≤ j ≤ i. The function F is a degree-i preimage
resistant (i-PR) function if it is infeasible to find pi, of size s + k, such that
ρi = F (pi).
We note that the notion of degree-i preimage resistance is similar to the well
known notion of one-way on iterates first introduced by Levin [Lev85]. Variations
of this notion was used later by other authors, see for example [GKL93]. We use
our variation of ‘one-way on iterates’ and give it the new name ‘degree-i preimage
resistance’ to be consistent with the later security notions of this paper and also
the literature on message recognition protocols.
The notion of degree-i preimage resistance is illustrated in Figure 1 as a game
between a player Oscar and a challenger.
Oscar Challenger
Choose random r1, . . . , ri of size k.
Choose random ρ0 of size s.
Compute ρj = F (ρj−1, rj),
for 1 ≤ j ≤ i
ρi←−−−−−
Find pi of size s+ k.
pi−−−−−→ Oscar wins if ρi = F (pi).
Fig. 1. Degree-i Preimage Resistant Game
Note that we obtain the classical notion of preimage resistance when i = 0.
Moreover, for k = 0, we obtain the depth-i preimage resistance considered by
Lucks et al. [LZWW08]. In other words, we are considering extra randomness
for each round, whereas they rely on the randomness of the root element of the
hash chain for the entire life time of the protocol.
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Definition 2. For randomly chosen secrets r1, . . . , ri−1, each having k bits, and
randomly chosen secret ρ0, of size s, let secret ρ1, . . . , ρi−2 and known ρi−1 be
such that ρj = F (ρj−1, rj), where 1 ≤ j ≤ i − 1. The function F is a degree-i
second preimage resistant (i-SPR) function if, given a random ri of size k,
it is infeasible to find pi, of size s+ k, such that F (ρi−1, ri) = F (pi).
Figure 2 depicts this notion as a game between a player and a challenger.
Oscar Challenger
Choose random r1, . . . , ri of size k.
Choose random ρ0 of size s.
Compute ρj = F (ρj−1, rj),
for 1 ≤ j ≤ i− 1
ρi−1, ri←−−−−−
Find pi of size s+ k.
pi−−−−−→ Oscar wins if F (ρi−1, ri) = F (pi).
Fig. 2. Degree-i Second Preimage Resistant Game
Again, note that for i = 1, we obtain the classical notion of second preimage
resistance. Furthermore, if we consider the case of k = 0, the case when the only
source of randomness is ρ0, we obtain the depth-i second preimage resistance of
Lucks et al. [LZWW08].
Definition 3. For randomly chosen secrets r1, . . . , ri, each having k bits, and
randomly chosen secret ρ0, of size s, let secret ρ1, . . . , ρi−1 and known ρi be such
that ρj = F (ρj−1, rj), where 1 ≤ j ≤ i. A message authentication code MAC is
F -degree-i existentially unforgeable (i-EU) if, knowing ρi, it is infeasible
to mount an existential forgery against MACρi−1 in an adaptive chosen message
attack scenario.
2.1 Pseudorandom Functions Satisfy i-PR
We now show that if F is a pseudorandom function, then the notion of degree-i
preimage resistance for F is equivalent to the notion of preimage resistance.
Theorem 1. Consider a pseudorandom function F : {0, 1}s+k → {0, 1}s and
let i be polynomial in s and k. Then, the function F is preimage resistant if and
only if it is degree-i preimage resistant.
We actually show a stronger result: if the distribution of F (ρ, pi), for (ρ, pi) ∈R
{0, 1}s+k, is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform distribution
using a single sample, then F is preimage resistant if and only if it is degree-i
preimage resistant.
Note that for k = 0, as in the case of properties introduced by Lucks et al.
[LZWW08], this property can only be true if almost all elements of {0, 1}s have
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a single preimage under F . For a random function F , the probability of every
value to have no preimage is roughly e−1. Hence, this property is almost never
achieved. And, this argument justifies the introduction of random values ri.
Proof. Define the success probability of a polynomially bounded player Oscar in
the iPR game to be
SucciPR := Pr(F (pi) = ρi),
where the probability is taken over all random choices of Oscar and the Chal-
lenger. In other words, F is an i-PR if and only if SucciPR is negligible. We
are going to first find an upperbound for |SucciPR − Succi−1PR | and use triangle
inequality to find an upper bound for |SucciPR − Succ1PR|.
Moreover, for a variable x of size s, define the degree-i distribution to be
DiPR(x) := Pr
r0,r1,...,ri
[ρi = x].
Note that D0PR is just the uniform distribution.
Consider a player, Charlie, who wants to distinguish a ρ following either DiPR
or Di−1PR . As illustrated in Figure 3, Charlie can use Oscar as a black-box. His
advantage is
AdviPR := |SucciPR − Succi−1PR |.
Oscar Charlie Challenger
Choose a random b from {i− 1, i}.
ρ←−−−−− Pick ρ ∈ {0, 1}s according to DbPR.
ρi←−−−−− Let ρi := ρ.
Find pi of size s+ k.
pi−−−−−→ If ρi = F (pi),
then b′ = i,
else b′ = i− 1.
b′−−−−−→
Fig. 3. Degree-i Distinguishing Game
On the other hand, Charlie can be transformed into a distinguisher Dave
between D1PR and D0PR. To see this, consider a player Dave who, given ρ, uses
Charlie as a black-box. This game is illustrated in Figure 4.
The advantage of Dave is equal to AdviPR. Therefore, Adv
i
PR = |SucciPR −
Succi−1PR | must be negligible. Now applying the triangle inequality i − 1 times,
we obtain that |SucciPR − Succ1PR| is negligible.
Note that Succ1PR is simply the success probability of the adversary in win-
ning the standard notion of preimage resistance for our function F . On the other
hand, if the function F is pseudorandom, then the advantage of any polynomial
time distinguisher between D1PR and D0PR must be negligible. Therefore, we have
shown that F is i-PR if and only if it is PR.
uunionsq
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Charlie Dave Challenger
Pick a random b from {0, 1}.
ρ←−−−−− Pick ρ ∈ {0, 1}s according to DbPR.
Choose random r2, r3, . . . , ri
of size k. Let ρ1 = ρ and
compute ρj = F (ρj−1, rj),
for 2 ≤ j ≤ i
ρi←−−−−−
b′−−−−−→ b
′
−−−−−→
Fig. 4. Reducing Degree-1 Distinguishing Game to Degree-i Distinguishing Game
2.2 Pseudorandom Functions Satisfy i-SPR
Similarly to the previous section, we show that the notions of degree-i second
preimage resistance and second preimage resistance are equivalent for a pseudo-
random function F .
Theorem 2. Consider a pseudorandom function F : {0, 1}s+k → {0, 1}s and
let i be polynomial in s and k. Then, the function F is second preimage resistant
if and only if it is degree-i second preimage resistant.
Again, we prove a slightly stronger statement than the Theorem. We prove
that if the distribution of F (ρ, pi), for (ρ, pi) ∈R {0, 1}s+k, is computationally
indistinguishable from the uniform distribution using a single sample, then F is
second preimage resistant if and only if it is degree-i second preimage resistant.
Proof. We define the success probability of a computationally bounded player
Oscar in the iSPR game to be
SucciSPR := Pr(F (pi) = F (ρi−1, ri)),
where the probability is taken over all random choices of Oscar and Challenger.
To show that F is iSPR, we need to show that SucciSPR is negligible. We
first find an upperbound for |SucciSPR − Succi−1SPR| and, then, using the triangle
inequality find an upperbound for |SucciSPR − Succ1SPR|.
Now consider Charlie who wants to distinguish ρ following either Di−1PR or
Di−2PR . Figure 5 is depicting Charlie when he is using Oscar as a black-box
to distinguish between a random value and ρi−1. This reduction implies that
|SucciSPR − Succi−1SPR| is the advantage for distinguishing Di−1PR from Di−2PR .
We conclude like in the proof of Theorem 1.
uunionsq
2.3 Existential Unforgeable MACs Are i-EU
In this section, given a pseudorandom functions F and a secure message authen-
tication code MAC, we show that MAC is also degree-i existentially unforgeable.
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Oscar Charlie Challenger
Choose b ∈R {i− 1, i− 2}.
ρ←−−−−− Pick ρ ∈ {0, 1}s according to DbPR.
ρ, r←−−−−− Pick r ∈R {0, 1}k.
Find pi of size s+ k.
pi−−−−−→ If F (ρ, r) = F (pi),
then b′ = i− 1,
else b′ = i− 2.
b′−−−−−→
Fig. 5. Degree-i Distinguishing Game
Theorem 3. Consider a message authentication code MAC : {0, 1}s×{0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}c and a function F : {0, 1}s+k → {0, 1}s, where k ≥ 2s. If i is polynomial
in s and k, and F is a pseudorandom function, then, the notions of existential
unforgeability and F -degree-i existential unforgeability are equivalent.
Proof. For a variable x, of size s, we define the following distribution
Diρ(x) = Pr
r
[F (ρ, r) = x].
We need to show that for all ρ, Diρ is indistinguishable from the uniform distri-
bution, using a single sample. This comes from (F (., r))r∈{0,1}k being a pseudo-
random function. As in the analysis in the previous proofs, i-EU is equivalent
to 1-EU. We now show that 1-EU is equivalent to EU.
Let Oscar be a player who finds standard existential forgeries, and Charlie be
a player who is trying to distinguish between D1ρ and the uniform distribution.
Now, Charlie uses Oscar as a black box, as illustrated in Figure 6. Note that
with b = 1, Oscar is a 1-EU adversary. On the other hand, with b = 0, Oscar
is a regular EU adversary (who is given a useless x). Let Succb=0(Oscar) be
the success probability of Oscar when b = 0 and Succb=1(Oscar) be his success
probability when b = 1.
For every ρ, the advantage of Charlie in distinguishing between D1ρ and the
uniform distribution is negligible. Hence, on average, the advantage is negligible
too. As a result, |Succb=0(Oscar)−Succb=1(Oscar)| is negligible. Thus, we obtain
that Succb=1(Oscar) is negligible if and only if Succb=0(Oscar) is negligible, that
is if MAC is existentially unforgeable.
uunionsq
2.4 Separation between PR and i-PR
We show that there is a separation between preimage resistance and degree-i
preimage resistance. This implies that considering both assumptions is necessary.
Let ` : {0, 1}s → {1, 2, . . . , s} be defined as `(x) = the number of leading zeros
of x. Consider a preimage resistant hash function H and define
F (x, r) := truncs(0`(x)+11‖H(x‖r)),
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Oscar Charlie Challenger
Choose ρ ∈R {0, 1}s.
Choose b ∈R {0, 1}.
Choose r ∈R {0, 1}k.
If b = 1
then x := F (ρ, r)
else pick x ∈R {0, 1}s
x, ρ←−−−−−
x←−−−−− Set a MAC oracle to key ρ.
m, c−−−−−→ If MACρ(m) = c
then b′ = 1,
else b′ = 0.
b′−−−−−→
Fig. 6. Reducing 1-EU to EU
where truncs outputs the first s bits of the input. Since H is preimage resistant,
F is also preimage resistant. However, F is not degree-s preimage resistant. One
can make similar constructions for degree-i second preimage resistance.
3 A Message Recognition Protocol Based on
Pseudorandom Functions
Consider a pseudorandom function F : {0, 1}s+k → {0, 1}s and a message au-
thentication code MAC : {0, 1}s × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}c with typical parameters
s ≥ 80, k ≥ 2s, and c ≥ 30. Moreover, let the maximum number of messages to
be authenticated be fixed to be n.
Alice randomly chooses a0, a1, . . . , an−1 of size k and α0 of size s, and forms
a chain of the form αi = F (αi−1, ai−1), i = 1, . . . , n. Analogously, Bob chooses
random b0, b1, . . . , bn−1 of size k and β0 of size s, and forms his chain of the form
βi = F (βi−1, bi−1), i = 1, . . . , n.
They start with index n and go downward in the α and β chains, revealing
elements of hash chains and the random keys in a descending order. In each
session i, Alice and Bob, respectively, use the random ai and bi as keys for the
MAC values they compute. On the other hand, they use αi and βi in session
i+ 1 to commit to ai and bi of session i.
The protocol starts with an initialization phase, illustrated in Figure 7, in
which Alice and Bob exchange αn and βn over an authenticated channel. Eve is
passive at this stage, hence, the channel is denoted by ⇒.
We first present a high level description of our protocol, depicted in Figure 8
based on the logic of the Jane Doe protocol. Although this high level presentation
does not include the details of our proposal, it helps in signifying the differences
and it gives a better big picture on how the hash chaining technique is modified
in order to obtain a security proof based on standard assumptions.
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Alice Bob
Choose random α0, a0, a1, . . . , an−1. Choose random β0, b0, b1, . . . , bn−1.
For i = 1, . . . , n, compute For i = 1, . . . , n, compute.
αi = F (αi−1, ai−1).
αn====⇒ βi = F (βi−1, bi−1).
βn⇐====
Set the internal state. Set the internal state.
Fig. 7. Initialization Phase
Alice Bob
Input (m, Bob)
di = MACαi (m)
m, di−−−−−−−−−−→ Receive m′, d′
βi, bi←−−−−−−−−−−
Receive β′, b′ and
If βi+1 = F (β
′, b′)
then
accept-key(β′, b′) and
send (αi, ai)
αi, ai−−−−−−−−−−→ Receive α′, a′
else If αi+1 = F (α
′, a′)
wait for a new (βi, bi) then
accept-key(α′, a′)
If d′ = MACα′ (m
′) then accept-message(m′).
else wait for a new αi, ai.
Fig. 8. High Level Description of our Message Recognition Protocol
Alice uses αi as the key for the MAC value, but also to make Bob recognize
her. Bob uses βi, so Alice will recognize him. However, bis are not used to send
a message. Note that the role of Alice, as the claimant, and the role of Bob,
as the verifier are not reversible. In other words, if Bob wishes to authenticate
messages to Alice, they should fix another pair of random keys. Indeed, if the
same αi and βi are used, a man-in-the-middle attack is possible.
In order to present the details of the logic of our proposed protocol, we adapt
the approach of Goldberg et al. [GMS09] to obtain a self-recoverable MRP. Note
that our building blocks are different from theirs and, more importantly, our
security assumptions are different. The point in adapting the logic of the protocol
is to ensure self-recoverability of the protocol.
The internal state of Alice includes (along with each variable’s initial value):
- iA := n− 1: the position of Alice in her chain.
- iaccA := n: the last index of Bob’s chain that was accepted by Alice.
- βA := βn: the last value of Bob’s chain that was accepted by Alice.
- bA := Null: the last value for Bob’s randomness accepted by Alice.
- M := Null: the input message to be authenticated in the current session.
- a one-bit flag, to distinguish the program states A0 and A1.
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Similarly, Bob’s internal state is as follows:
- iB := n− 1: the position of Bob in his chain.
- iaccB := n: the last index of Alice’s chain that was accepted by Bob.
- αB := αn: the last value of Alice’s chain that was accepted by Bob.
- aB := Null: the last value for Bob’s randomness accepted by Alice.
- e′ := Null: the MAC value received in the current session, supposedly from
Alice.
- M ′ := Null: the message received in the current session, supposedly from Alice.
- a one-trit flag, to distinguish the program states B0, B1, and B2.
We write commit-message(M, iA) to indicate that Alice is committing herself
to sending the messageM to Bob in session iA. We let T be the maximum amount
of time Alice waits to receive a response from Bob, and vice versa. Alice and
Bob start in program states A0 and B0.
A0 is executed as follows:
If iA ≤ 0 then Abort.
Receive input (M).
Compute eiA := MACαiA (iA‖M).
Send [eiA ,M ] to Bob and goto A1.
B0 is executed as follows:
If iB ≤ 0 then Abort.
Wait to receive [e′,M ′], then goto B1.
B1 has the following description:
Send [iB , βiB−1, biB ] to Alice and goto B2.
A1 is performed in the following manner:
Wait at most time T to receive [i′B , β
′, b′].
If [i′B , β
′, b′] is received, then
If iaccA = i′B , βA = β
′, and bA = b′ (Bob has not received the last flow
of the previous session) then
Let N := Null.
Send [iaccA, αiaccA−1, aiaccA , N ] and goto A0.
If iA = i′B and βA = F (β
′, b′) then (Alice and Bob seem to be synchro-
nized.)
Let N := M .
Send [iA, αiA−1, aiA , N ] to Bob.
Let iaccA := i′B , iA := iA − 1, βA := β′, bA := b′. (Alice updates her
state.)
goto A0.
else Resend [eiA ,M ] to Bob and goto A1.
If timeout then
Resend [eiA ,M ] to Bob and goto A1.
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B2 is performed as follows:
Wait at most time T to receive [i′A, α
′, a′, N ′].
If [i′A, α
′, a′, N ′] is received, then
If i′A = iB and αB = F (α
′, a′) then (Alice and Bob seem to be synchro-
nized.)
If N ′ = M ′ and e′ = MACα′(i′A‖M ′) then
Accept(M ′, iB).
else Accept(Null).
Let iaccB := i′A, iB := iB − 1, αB := α′, aB := a′. (Bob updates his
state.)
goto B0.
else goto B1.
If timeout, then goto B1.
Alice Bob
Internal state: iA, iaccA, βA, bA, M Internal state: iB , iaccB , αB , aB , e
′, M ′
A0: B0:
If iA ≤ 0 then Abort. If iB ≤ 0 then Abort.
Receive and set M .
Compute eiA := MACαiA
(iA‖M).
Send [eiA ,M ].
eiA ,M−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Receive [e′,M ′].
A1: B1:
Receive [i′B , β
′, b′].
iB , βiB−1, biB←−−−−−−−−−−−−− Send [iB , βiB−1, biB ].
If iaccA = i
′
B , βA = β
′, and bA = b′
then
Let N := Null.
Send [iaccA, αiaccA−1, aiaccA , N ]
goto A0.
If iA = i
′
B and βA = F (β
′, b′)
then
Let N :=M . B2:
Send [iA, αiA−1, aiA , N ].
iA, αiA−1, aiA , N−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Receive [i′A, α′, a′, N ′].
Let iaccA := i
′
B , iA := iA − 1 and If i′A = iB and αB = F (α′, a′) then
βA := β
′, bA := b′. If N ′ =M ′ and e′ = MACα′ (i
′
A‖M ′)
goto A0. then Accept(M ′, iB).
else Resend [eiA ,M ] and goto A1. else Accept(Null).
Let iaccB := i
′
A, iB := iB − 1 and
aB := a
′, αB := α′.
goto B0.
else goto B1.
Fig. 9. Proposed Message Recognition Protocol
Figure 9 illustrates the common case of our protocol. It is worth mentioning
that since we are basing our protocol on the logic of the message recognition
protocol of Goldberg et al. [GMS09], the security analysis, specially the reduc-
tions, are similar to those presented in their paper. For example, our protocol
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directly inherits the self-recoverability property of their protocol. Hence, we do
not discuss self-recoverability. On the other hand, we stress that we are using
different assumptions and primitives to start with. Hence, we obtain a different
protocol and it deserves its own security analysis.
3.1 Security Result
In Appendix A, we prove the following theorem which is analogous to the Secu-
rity and Self-recoverability Theorem of Goldberg et al. [GMS09].
Theorem 4. A successful adversary against the protocol of Section 3 who ef-
ficiently deceives Bob into accepting (M ′,i), where M ′ is not Null and Alice
did not send M ′ in session i, implies an efficient algorithm that finds degree-i
preimages or degree-i second preimages, or creates degree-i existential forgeries.
Moreover, the adversary cannot stop Alice and Bob from successfully executing
the protocol unless she is actively disrupting the communication for the lifetime
of Alice and Bob.
The above theorem together with the theorems of Section 2, namely Theo-
rems 1, 2, and 3, imply the following theorem.
Theorem 5 (Final result). Consider a pseudorandom function F : {0, 1}s+k →
{0, 1}s, k ≥ 2s, and a message authentication code MAC : {0, 1}s × {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}c. Moreover, let i be polynomial in s and k. If F is preimage resistant and
second preimage resistant, and if MAC is existentially unforgeable, then there is
no efficient adversary against the ith session of the protocol of Section 3.
The condition on i being a polynomial in s and k is unavoidable to get
negligible advantage for the distinguishers in Theorems 1, 2, and 3. On the other
hand, note that i ≤ n to begin with and, hence, this assumption is reasonable.
3.2 Discussion
Our MRP shares some similarities with protocols based on hash chains (e.g.,
TESLA [HPJ02], OTP (S/Key) [HMNS98], Lamport authentication [Lam81]).
These protocols can adapt to different data structures such as hash trees (see
for example, Merkle signatures [Mer89] and Merkle tree traversal [Szy04]) and
can be turned into dynamic ones (consult Naor and Yung [NY89]).
Once our MRP is in place in both directions, using two separate pairs of
chains, we can use the last two iterations to authenticate some new αn and βn
to be able to continue. Note that using the same pair of hash chains in both
directions results in man-in-the-middle type of attacks.
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4 Conclusion
Incorporating random coins in every step of a hash chain, we proposed the first
MRP which is provably secure in the standard model and based on standard
assumptions. Our protocol uses two primitives, a pseudorandom function F :
{0, 1}s+k → {0, 1}s and an existential unforgeable message authentication code
MAC : {0, 1}s × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}c.
We defined new notions of security for our primitives, F and MAC, namely
degree-i preimage resistance and degree-i second preimage resistance for F , and
F -degree-i existential unforgeability for MAC. Then, we showed that these new
properties are equivalent to the standard notions of preimage resistance, second
preimage resistance, and existential unforgeability under the assumption that F
is a pseudorandom function.
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A Proof of Theorem 4
We list all possible attacks against our protocol and show that they are all
infeasible when the assumptions listed in Section 2 hold. This discussion is similar
to what is presented by Goldberg et al. [GMS09].
Eve remains passive for a period of time and, at some point, she gets active
to carry out her attack. Since Eve was a passive observer before the attack, it
holds that iA = iB before she starts her attack. Let i := iA = iB and observe
that at the start of session i we have iaccA = iaccB = i+1, aB = ai+1, bA = bi+1,
αB = αi, βA = βi.
We adapt the approach of Gehrmann [Geh98] in listing all possible attacks
by considering different orderings of the flows. Gehrmann labels a flow by A
when the recipient is Alice. Analogously, a flow is labelled as B, if the recipient
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is Bob. One distinguishes between the attacks that are started in one session
and are completed in the same session versus the attacks that are started in one
session and completed in a later session, named multi-session attacks.
We first analyze single-session attacks. Recall that Eve has been passive be-
fore the session the attack takes place and was only observing the activities.
Hence, the attack is started and completed in session i. Gehrmann [Geh98] has
showed that there are only
(
4
2
)
= 6 different single-session attacks for a three flow
protocol. In his notation, these attacks are labelled as AABB, ABAB, BBAA,
ABBA, BABA, and BAAB. We will reduce the AABB and BBAA attack scenar-
ios to degree-i preimage resistant or degree-i second preimage resistant games.
Moreover, we reduce the ABAB attack scenario to degree-i existential forgeries,
degree-i preimage resistant, or degree-i second preimage resistant games.
Alice Eve Bob
M←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− A
eiA
,M
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
i′B, β
′, b′
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− A
iA, αiA−1, aiA ,N−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ B e
′,M′−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
iB, βiB−1, biB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
B
i′A,α
′, a′, N′
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 10. AABB Attack
AABB Attack. This attack scenario is depicted in Figure 10. Recall that
up until the start of this session, Alice and Bob were synchronized having iA =
iB = i. Hence, Eve has to set i′A := i, otherwise Bob will detect Eve, and i
′
B := i,
otherwise Alice will detect Eve. Moreover, recall that βA = βi and αB = αi. Alice
sends iA, αiA−1, aiA , N to Eve if and only if i
′
B , β
′, b′ are verified. It implies that
unless βA = F (β′, b′), Alice will not cooperate with Eve. Hence, having seen βi
and not having seen βi−1, bi, Eve has to find β′ and b′ such that βi = F (β′, b′).
That is, Eve has to win the degree-i preimage resistant game of Definition 1.
BBAA Attack. This scenario is shown in Figure 11. For Eve not to be
detected by Bob, she has to find i′A, α
′, a′, and N ′ such that they get verified by
Bob. Note that Eve has αB = αi from the previous session. This implies that,
not having seen αi−1, ai, Eve has to find α′ and a′ such that αi = F (α′, a′).
Again, if Eve successfully finds such α′ and a′, then she can win the degree-i
preimage resistant game of Definition 1.
ABAB Attack. Figure 12 illustrates this scenario. Eve first receives βiB−1 =
βi−1 and biB = bi. Then, she has the choice between setting (β
′, b′) = (βi−1, bi)
or (β′, b′) 6= (βi−1, bi). Let us assume that she sets (β′, b′) 6= (βi−1, bi). In or-
der for Eve not to get detected by Alice, Eve must find β′ and b′ such that
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Alice Eve Bob
B
e′,M′−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
iB, βiB−1, biB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
M←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− A B
i′A,α
′, a′, N′
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
eiA
,M
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
i′B, β
′, b′
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− A
iA, αiA−1, aiA ,N−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 11. BBAA Attack
Alice Eve Bob
M←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− A
eiA
,M
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ B e
′,M′−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
i′B, β
′, b′
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− A
iB, βiB−1, biB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
iA, αiA−1, aiA ,N−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ B
i′A,α
′, a′, N′
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 12. ABAB Attack
F (β′, b′) = F (βi−1, bi). This implies that she has to win the degree-i second
preimage resistant game of Definition 2.
Now, assume that (β′, b′) = (βi−1, bi). Alice will verify β′ and b′ and, then,
send iA, αiA−1, aiA , N . Again, Eve has the choice between setting (α
′, a′) =
(αi−1, ai) or (α′, a′) 6= (αi−1, ai). In order to set (α′, a′) 6= (αi−1, ai) and not
get detected by Bob, she has to win the degree-i second preimage resistant game
of Definition 2. Let us now assume that she chooses (α′, a′) = (αi−1, ai). For Eve
not to get detected by Bob, she has to first set N ′ := M ′. Moreover, not knowing
a′, Eve must have set e′ := MACα′(i′A‖M ′), for M ′ to be verified by Bob. Hence,
Eve has to perform a degree-i existential forgery, introduced in Definition 3.
It can be shown that the remaining three attack scenarios are reduced to the
former three scenarios. In particular, one can reduce the BABA attack to the
ABBA attack. Next, the ABBA attack is reduced to the ABAB attack. Last,
but not least, one reduces the BAAB attack to the ABAB attack. It remains to
take care of multi-session attacks against our protocol. Analogous to the analysis
presented by Goldberg et.al [GMS09], one can show that multi-session attacks
and show that they reduce to single-session attacks. The reductions for our
protocol are analogous to the reductions presented by Goldberg et.al [GMS09],
hence, we do not repeat them here.
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